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ABSTRACT
This thesis develops a model of burden-sharing that
includes both operational and non-operational contributions to
the common defense. Based on the "Atlanticist" perspective of
recognizing contribution, the model includes categories for
standing forces, reserve forces, defense industrial capacity,
reserve defense industrial capacity, and related defense
factors that historically have not been recognized. This work
addresses the availability of information suitable for the
comparative evaluation of defense share within the model
framework and identifies deficiencies in current data bases
relative to the defense industrial capacities of participating
nations. Recommendations for providing defense industrial
base information center around tailoring OECD capacity
utilization equations to defense industry parameters and
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The changing threat in Europe is destined to significantly
impact the resolve of nations for fielding and maintaining
large standing forces. Competing social and economic programs
will erode financial support, and the perception of reduced
threat will undermine popular support for such forces. The
NATO Alliance will remain intact for some time but the
definition and miqsion of that alliance may evolve to embrace
global interests and mutual economic concerns.
Historically contributions to the near static balance of
forces that preserved the status-quo in Europe served as a
basis for the comparison of the defense burden among member
nations. As the political and economic complexion of the
European theatre changes, so will the definition of required
defense capability for the NATO Alliance. While force and
mission definitions remain unresolved, current dialogue and
planning suggest a stronger emphasis on reserve forces. This
potential change in the NATO force structure provides an
opportunity to redefine burden-sharing within the
alliance. The question of "fair share" in funding the
alliance has always been difficult to define clearly, but as
the evolution of NATO force requirements progresses, the way
comparative burdens among participating nations is viewed must
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also change. The approach in the past of comparing
quantitative proxies must be expanded to include recognition
of both operational and non-operational components, ensuring
fair recognition for all members' contributions.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this thesis are threefold:
1. Develop an alternative model for evaluating defense
burden shares which includes components of standing forces,
reserve forces, defense industrial capacity, reserve defense
industrial capacity, and related defense factors which have
not previously been included in the burden sharing formula.
2. Explore information available to support comparative
evaluation using the revised model.
3. Identify deficiencies in information bases and
develop recommendations for the development of such data.
C. PRINCIPAL RESEARCH QUESTION
Can a model be developed that more fully incorporates the
fundamental categories of defense contribut:ins appropriate
for NATO members following the realignmen, of Europe; and
secondarily, are sufficient data currently available, or
methods for obtaining such data, to support the proposed model
of NATO burden-sharing.
D. SCOPE
This thesis will address an alternate approach to the
current methods of quantitative proxies as measures of defense
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burden-sharing within the NATO alliance.
A model incorporating standing forces, reserve forces,
defense industrial capacity, reserve defense industrial
capacity and other non-operational factors will be developed.
This work will not attempt to define an aggregate
quantitative index for comparison of defense burden shares
among participating nations, or specific indices for sub-areas
of the burden-sharing model.
Emphasis will be placed on the identification of existing
information and data bases, and the collection mechanisms for
such information to support the future comparative evaluation
of defense burden shares.
Z. METHODOLOGY
The model of NATO burden-sharing proposed within, as well
as the conclusions and recommendations drawn, result largely
from a survey of existing literature and indications provided
by current research and congressional testimony. Where
possible, persons involved directly with NATO burden-sharing
issues were consulted. Most of the information relevant to
this study has been obtained from reference material less than
five years old. That which provides the foundation for the
proposed model, and forms the basis of underlying assumptions
is current as of this writing. Where clear statements of
policy or proposed policy are unavailable, assumptions based
upon documented recommendations and "the most likely course of
events" have been made.
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F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The following chapters are organized in such a manner as
to present the general perceptions of burden-sharing currently
influencing national positions relative to the alliance.
These perceptions allow the framing of the burden-sharing
problem in terms of different points of view, which will be
described in detail later. This separation of approaches to
the problem allows for a clear identification of the position
from which the burden-sharing model presented in this work is
developed.
A description of burden-sharing, and the limitations of
those methods is followed by the development of the critical
assumptions which provide the foundation for an alternative
model. The model for a redefinition of NATO burden-sharing
defines five basic categories of quantifiable contributions to
alliance defense in terms of efficiency. The determination of
the elements to be included in these categories is dependent
upon the framework in which the issues are defined.
Limitations of the model will be discussed prior to
specific conclusions and recommendations. Issues requiring
further research are identified when resolution or further
definition of such issues will significantly effect the
implementation of the model.
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G. LITERATURE REVIEW
1. Perceptions of Burden-sharing
The burden-sharing debate has been steeped in
arguments of fairness and equity throughout the history of the
NATO alliance. How these arguments are viewed is a function
of perceptions. Cooper and Zycher [Ref. l:p. 8] outline two
fundamental approaches to the issues of burden-sharing: the
"Fundamentalist" and the "Atlanticist." A brief survey of
these approaches and associated perceptions are presented as
background to support a model redefining burden-sharing.
a. The Fundamentalist
The Fundamentalist approach to burden-sharing is
concerned with issues of fair share and the importance of
equality of financial sacrifice and effort. This approach
assumes that free-riding' is the major reason for lower
' Defense is a classic example of a "public good." A
public good is one that satisfies two conditions: first, it
must be a joint consumption good, that is, one that can be
simultaneously consumed by more that one person without
diminishing the value to another; secondly, it is
prohibitively expensive or impossible to deny access to those
who have not paid for the good. Once provided, the benefits
are available to all whether paid for by all or not.
Since defense meets the definition of a public good,
nations within an alliance will enjoy benefits even as their
contributions to the common defense vary. The economic
incentive exists to decrease defense spending since this will
not significantly decrease the total "defense" enjoyed by the
nation. This "free-ride" tends to reduce the total quantity
of the public good that is provided and shift the burden of
cost to those who place the highest value on the good. Within
alliances, free-riding results in a less than optimal amount
of defense, and those who value that defense most highly will
bear a disproportionate share of the cost.
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defense shares in Europe. The Fundamentalist view holds that
each member should spend proportionately as much as the other.
Failing to do so warrants a reduction in spending by the major
providers, and as a result decreased economic benefits to each
member. For example, the United States has been considered a
major provider to West Germany, such that failure to spend
proportionately on defense by Germany would warrant reducing
U.S. troop strength on German soil.
This approach is quite narrow in perspective.
Expenditures on defense and defense inputs such as troops,
guns, aircraft etc., are not the same for all participating
countries. Nor can they be since the ability to pay or to
produce is not the same.
Measuring defense burden as a proportion of
gross domestic product attempts to equalize costs by providing
that each member will contribute the same percentage of GDP.
However, this aggregate approach does not take into account
the differences in the marginal value of economic output among
nations. Since members enjoy different levels of economic
activity, some argue that a progressive correction should be
applied such that those with the more advanced economies would
pay a proportionately greater share of defense costs. This
concept of "progressivity" is analogous to progressive income
tax systems found in the United States and the United Kingdom.
The Fundamentalist view tends to ignore these
limitations. Further, it gives no consideration for
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contributions associated with host nation support and defense
related aid within the alliance. As will be shown, it is very
difficult to develop a measure of proportionate burdens when
comparing only capital expenditures, defense hardware or troop
equivalents.
The aggregate approach to defining defense
burden fails for the following reasons. First., not all
defense expenditures are directly related to the alliance. A
high volume producer of defense goods, with additional non-
alliance defense concerns is credited for more than the member
who produces less but whose production solely supports the
alliance. On the other hand, a highly efficient producer
capable of achieving equivalent production output at less cost
might be penalized relative to less efficient producers.
b. The Atlanticist
The Atlanticist approach is concerned with a
practical solution leading to military efficiency, and
enhancing alliance unity. Limitations on defense spending
resulting from domestic political constraints are accepted.
The Atlanticist approach is not focused on defense
expenditures, but rather on military inputs that support
NATO's commonly agreed upon defense strategy. Since the focus
in not on defense spending per se, variability in defense
spending amongst allies is acconurtcdated by consideration for
contribution to strategy and does not seek equalization of
costs. This approach provides both benefits to the alliance
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in terms of providing the inputs to effectively serve mission
requirements, and benefits in terms of production
specialization for the contributing member. While the
benefits of flexibility and efficiency in the operational
sense seem attractive, the lack of clearly defined target
levels and production goals for each member makes this
approach vulnerable to public criticism. The perception of
equitable contribution among participating members of the
alliance must be actively managed.
c. Comparative Views
Defense expenditures and military inputs are not
the only measures on which the Fundamentalist and the
Atlanticist differ. Perceptions also make a difference
because they influence domestic political decisions and
popular support. For the Fundamentalist, there is a static
assumption that NATO's unity, cohesion and collective
agreement are constant; that within the alliance there is a
common perception of threat; and that there is an unquestioned
belief in the commitment of the United States to the NATO
alliance.
The Atlanticist approach is more attuned to
differences in perceptions within the alliance. Efforts are
directed toward developing common perceptions from which
agreement on strategy and requisite defense commitment can be
derived. Differences in perception need not always be
resolved since the legitimacy of a national defense philosophy
is recognized for all members.
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A final point of comparison between the
Atlanticist and the Fundamentalist involves how participation
of U.S. Forces in Europe is viewed. The Fundamentalist sees
the role of the United States as helping Europeans defend
themselves, whereas the Atlanticist sees the direct
involvement of U.S. Forces in Europe as serving the interests
of U.S. national security.
A summary of key points associated with these




TWO APPROACHES TO BURDEN-SHARING
Fundamnt alist Atlanticist
" Focus aot defense spending * Focus on provision of military
relative to GNP inputS to European defense
" NATO cohesion is assumned * Strengthening NATO cohesion is a
comutiowing objective
a. .S commaitinetit n. Credibility of U.S. commitment
fully credible not taheit for granted
b. Assunmes a common threat 1). Ntirrowing differences in
perception European and U.S. threat
P)ercelitiotis inuportnnt
c. Assomes shanrcd viewv of c. Recognizes differing
deterrent effect of vicws of dleterrence
con~ventional war-lighting
climblilities
d. Out-of-area cooperatiun di. Out-or-nrea cooperation has
expected to he negotiated as a
case-by-case basis
e. Domrslic political e. Rtecognizes legitimacy of
cooiritints on defense domestic political
sitelding; seen as largely cunstraints
excuses for free-riding
" U.S. forces ill ltirope to * U.S. forces ill Europe primarily
help) Europeans defend to serve U.S. national security
a. Sesrontrihutin of a. Rtecognizes political contri-
U.S. forces ast solely hbuiion of U.S. forces to NATO
military in character cuohesion
bt. Withhnldiog U.S. force bt. Rtepercussions of wvithdrawing
would comltpel Europeans U.S. forces from Europe not
to spend nmore fur own certain
cefetise
Source: Cooper and Zycher, Percepti~ons of
NATO Burden-Sharing
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It is important that the reader understand the
differences between the two approaches to burden-sharing.
Model development for this work will assume the Atlanticist
perspective as it more closely fits the emergent political
scenario for Europe in the 1990's.
2. Proxies as Quantitative Measures
To date, most approaches to the question of equity of
burden within the alliance have been supported by indices
derived from various data bases. The equity issue seeks to
measure fairness. Gates points out that from an economic point
of view, each member of the alliance should contribute an
amount equal to the benefits received [Ref. 2:p. 6]. A fair
distribution of the defense burden then, might have some
members bearing a disproportionate share of the costs if those
members also receive a disproportionate share of the benefits.
Given that fairness has yet to be defined within the context
of the NATO burden-sharing issue, members have evaluated
contributions by comparing quantitative proxies.
Quantitative proxies used to measure defense burdens
can be categorized by measurement type: input measures and
output measures. Input measures seek to define the resources
a nation assigns to defense production or procurement, usually
as a function of Gross National Product (GNP), or Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). Output measures view how nations'
defense expenditures contribute to the overall capability of
the alliance.
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The use of proxy measurements in the burden-sharing
debate fails to clearly define the position of the member
nation for three reasons: first, the approach fails to
consider benefits derived from participation in the alliance;
second, it is not possible to find common ground between
nations on which expenditures should be included in the
measurement base; and third it is very difficult to adjust
contributions or expenditures for ability to pay.
a. Opportunity Costs and Discounting
The concepts of opportunity cost and discounting
are central to the failure of quantitative proxies to clearly
establish the level of contribution and subsequently the
fairness of that contribution.
Opportunity costs are defined as the value of an
option forgone as a result of selecting an alternate economic
activity. A nation considering its position relative to
others in the alliance must do so by considering what must be
given up internally to increase defense expenditures, or what
can be gained domestically by decreasing the amount of
resources committed to defense. This is often the focus of
debate internally as popular support is sought to increase or
decrease defense expenditures.
Opportunity costs differ between countries.
Marginal analysis provides that the value of the last dollar
spent will be different for two countries purchasing or
producing goods. Additionally, efficiency considerations
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dictate that dollars spent on defense will provide varying
quantity, quality and capability between member nations.
Member nations recognize these differences in marginal value
and efficiencies, and as a result discount the contributions
of other participating nations. The process of discounting
then, is not recognizing the full value of the other members'
contributions, which results in a relative increase in one's
own comparative expenditures.
Within the NATO alliance, and throughout its
history, the principal of autonomous national defense
decisions has been unanimously supported. Spending levels for
members' contributions to the alliance are determined by the
member nation and are driven by national interests. Because
of this, discounting is inevitable. Nations will always
discount the contributions of other nations because of
judgments on comparative efficiencies, relevance of
contributions to the alliance, and the national strategic
value of alliance objectives [Ref. l:p. 15].
Perceptions of burden-sharing issues are
critical from all vantage points within the alliance.
Participants in any burden-sharing debate must filter
information through logic that accounts for bias and motives
that are naturally at work in all member nations. Because
such variations in perception exist, national motives often
eclipse alliance needs. For that reason the "Atlanticist"
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approach best serves as a basis for the development of this
model.
3. Current Methods
"Any attempt to compare the burden-sharing efforts of
individual countries must be made with caution, given the wide
variation in the countries' ability to contribute to the
collective defense." [Ref. 3:p. 2-2] Even with the known
inherent limits of quantitative proxies as representatives of
the defense burden, they continue to be the primary source of
analysis.
The Department of Defense, in its annual report to
Congress on the allied contribution to the common defense,
uses three categories of quantitative measure. These are: (1)
indicators of a nation's ability to contribute; (2) indicators
of a nation's actual contributions; and (3) indicators that
measure nation's actual contribution as a function of their
ability to contribute [Ref. 3:p. 2-1]. Additionally, most
comparisons utilize these quantitative measures by expressing
them as a relative measure, such as a share of a combined
total, or as a percentage of the value of the highest ranking
nation. The most common measurement bases are gross domestic
product (GDP), and per capita gross domestic product, since
these are commonly used as indices of economic development and
standard of living. As such, the actual contribution to
defense is commonly considered as a proportion of GDP or per
capita GDP.
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a. Indicators of Actual Contribution
The following discussion addresses the eight
major measures of contribution to defense currently used by
the Department of Defense in the analysis of shared burden.
Consideration for data problems and limitations of these
indicators are included.
Since the official U.S. estimates of Allied
contributions are provided in an annual report to Congress by
the Secretary of Defense [Ref. 3], those definitions and
descriptions will be used in this work to provide consistency.
Efforts to measure defense contribution draw
heavily on a nation's ability to contribute and indicators of
actual contribution. Indicators of ability to contribute
include gross domestic product share, population share, and
per capita gross domestic product. These elements are defined
as follows: gross domestic product share, the total value of
goods and services produced by a country in proportion to
total NATO GDP; population share, the total amount of human
resources available to each nation in proportion to total NATO
population; and per capita GDP, which is gross domestic
product divided by population. [Ref. 3:p. 2-10] These
indicators provide a base from which relative contribution is
measured.
The analysis of actual contribution is based on
eight selected indicators. (Ref. 3:p 2-5] These are: defense
spending share, percentage change in defense spending, active
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defense manpower share, percentage change in active defense
manpower share, active and reserve manpower share, ground
force division equivalent firepower (DEF), air force tactical
combat aircraft share and naval tonnage share.
The content of these indicators is described as
follows: Defene Spending (Fiscal Year). Officially recorded
defense share figures which are based upon a commonly agreed
NATO definition of what is to be included as defense spending.
While this is the most comprehensive indicator of defense
effort, it measures input, not output, and makes no allowance
for such non-operational factors as host nation support or
contributions to developing defense industries (DDI).
Percentage Change in Defense Spending (Fiacal Year 1971 vs
1988). This measure provides an indicator of changes in real
defense spending in constant 1971 dollars. Current figures
(1989-1990) have been computed using constant 1988 prices and
exchange rates, though firm figures for these years are not
yet available. [Ref. 3:p A-11, fn. 1]
Active Defense Manpower Share. A measure of active duty
military and civilian manpower levels in peacetime. Because
the use of civilian personnel for military tasks varies from
country to country, inclusion of these figures allows a better
assessment of the total defense related manpower pool.
Percentage Change in Active Defenae Manpower Levela (.977 va
1988). Provides an indicator of changes in peacetime active-
duty defense manpower resources.
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Active and Reserve Defense Manpower Share. Includes peacetime
active-duty end strengths and civilian manpower levels, plus
an estimate of "committed reserves." Committed reserves are
those that will mobilize to attain wartime authorized
strength.
Ground Forces Division Equivalent Firepower (DEF) Share.
Measures the effectiveness of ground forces as a function of
the quantity and quality of their major weapons. This measure
provides a reasonable comparative basis for non-similar units.
It should be noted that critical combat factors such as
sustainability, logistical support, training, communications
and morale are omitted.
Air Force Tactical Combat Aircraft Share. A numerical
assessment of major types of combat aircraft in inventory,
including fighter/interceptor, fighter/bomber, conventional
bomber, and tactical reconnaissance aircraft in air force
inventories. Naval and Army aircraft are accounted for under
separate categories.
Naval Tonnage Share. Includes the aggregate tonnage of all
major classes of ships, excluding ballistic missile
submarines.
4. Limitations of Current Methods
It is clear that any approach to measuring defense is
limited by the quality of the data upon which comparisons are
made. These include problems associated with fluctuating
currency exchange rates, differing approaches to defense
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budgeting, and the fact that no quantitative measures
effectively measure the quality or the will of military
forces. Data used in comparisons are usually provided by the
country in question, and each country has its own budgetary,
financial and tax systems. Each has a different method of
recruiting, training and equipping manpower, so comparisons on
personnel matters are difficult. It is additionally likely
that nations will provide data in such a way as to favor their
own position. Quoting from a Congressional Research Service
report to congress [Ref. 4:p. 50-51]:
Thus, determining what constitutes an equitable
sharing of alliance burdens is an important but,
ultimately, subjective political process. There is no
scientific formulation for determining objectively
precise and "fair" shares of cost/benefit
relationships. Self-interest naturally dictates that
U.S. officials should try to get the allies to take the
actions necessary to relieve the defense burden
confronting the American people. Similarly, European
and Japanese officials see it as their responsibility
to pursue defense spending policies and diplomacy that
will secure the maximum benefits for the least cost to
their citizens.
Then by necessity, subjectivity on the value of input
information and subsequently limits on the value of
comparative defense burden must be accepted.
NATO has attempted to deal with some of the
comparative problems of the burden-sharing issue by agreeing
on a common definition of what constitutes defense
expenditures. This agreement contains very broad definitions,
and does not undermine the NATO premise that actions taken by
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a nation in support of the alliance will be taken is such a
way as to support the national defense requirements first.
Under the NATO agreement, expenditures for a given
period must represent payments made for that same period
regardless of when funds are disbursed for accounting
purposes. Indirect costs associated with national tax or
accounting systems are not counted as payments. Domestic
security forces may be counted as contribution to the common
defense if they are issued military equipment, have had
military training and would come under military authority
during wartime. Nations may count military pension systems and
unreimbursed military assistance to other members of the
alliance. Nations may not count the costs of war damage,
veterans' benefits, civil defense, or the stockpiling of
strategic materials [Ref. 3]. Conspicuously absent from the
agreement are credits for defense related issues, and social
issues that support economic growth or enhance cohesion within
the alliance. Many would argue that credit for host nation
support should be available to those nations with NATO
infrastructure obligations. Others feel that social program
investment and economic growth issues also have a place in the
formulation of "fairness of share."
As stated in the Secretary of Defense's Report on the
Allied Contribution to the Common Defense, April 1990: "The
definition (of burden-sharing) is substantially complete but
does not cover all the possible cases. Any division between
19
defense expenditures and other public outlays which contribute
to NATO security is partially and necessarily arbitrary."
Clearly then, examining the current definition of defense
expenditures with an eye on expanding that definition to
include more non-operational issues is worth pursuing.
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II. NATO BURDEN-SHARING:
REDEFINITION FOR A CHANGING EUROPEAN THREAT
A. CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS
The world's political situation is changing at a blinding
pace. To project beyond the current dynamic state to a static
balance of military and political forces is impossible at this
time. Accepting these limits on defining the future balance of
world power, certain critical assumptions must be made to
allow the development of any model of force structure and the
associated costs.
The assumptions that follow are supported by current
reports and recommendations from within the Department of
Defense and by independent study groups. These assumptions
and subsequently the burden-sharing model that follows will
not deal with the implications of the debate between the
continental and maritime strategies or their competing demands
for resources. Rather, the following assumptions begin by
recognizing the NATO-Warsaw Pact status quo as the historical
equilibrium point from which the system must move in balance.
The model that will be developed is based upon the
following four primary assumptions.
1. NATO as a defense alliance will remain intact through
the year 2005.
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2. NATO will scale back its commitment of operational
forces in light of the perceived reduction of threat
associated with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
3. There will be a diminishing political resolve of
participating nations to maintain large, standing military
forces.
4. As both the requirement and support for large
standing forces decreases, the defense commitment will shift
in part to reserve forces and reserve industrial capacity.
The following chapter will examine these assumptions and
related issues in the context of burden-sharing, and the roles
each will play in the development of a redefined burden-
sharing model.
1. NATO's Defense Role Will Remain Viable Through the
Year 2005.
From the point of view of the NATO alliance, the
perception of threat in Europe is changing. Throughout the
history of the NATO alliance, the organization has been
successful in maintaining peace in the European region.
Because of this success, there exists both popular and
political trust for both the mission and the capabilities of
the alliance. Granted, factions exist that argue that the
need for the alliance is past, and there are those who contend
that the very existence of such an alliance only serves to
undermine the prospects for peace. Such factions have always
existed. Consensus, however, has generally supported the
alliance.
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The defense role for NATO, to be distinguished from
a diplomatic or economic role, will remain at least until a
new military balance emerges and economic stabilization is at
hand. For purposes of this work, it is assumed that the basic
defense obligation will remain as the primary role through the
year 2005.
While it is likely that the alliance as it exists
today may evolve to something quite different, for the present
NATO is expected to serve as a stabilizer during the build
down of conventional forces in Europe. Further, the alliance
will help guarantee regional security while the Soviet Union
redesigns its economy and while the European Economic
Community emerges and formally stabilizes.
The fragmentation of the Soviet Union raises
questions for regional security that cannot be answered at
this time. For example, the reunification of Germany, with its
great economic potential and legacy of aggression, may not be
viewed as contributing to stability by some members of the
European community. NATO may well serve as the controlling
structure through which a united Germany can stabilize its
economy. Additionally, questions concerning a reversal in the
new policies and programs within the Soviet Union must remain,
including retrenchment and the reemergence of a stronger
Warsaw Pact.
The European theatre is not the only area that will
require a defense commitment in the future. While NATO has
23
historically resisted the commitment of forces to out-of-area
operations, the increasing threat by third world nations and
terrorism will soon pressure NATO to assume the operational
roles to counter such threats.
The alliance may serve as a unified, credible
deterrence to global third world terrorist activity and
insurgencies. The alliance must consider lesser
conflicts with the Soviet Union along the Soviet
periphery, the advent of potential third world
adversaries armed with advanced weaponry, and third
world "low intensity conflict" [Ref. 6].
Such threats clearly exist, as witnessed by the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait, and the economic vulnerability felt by all who
depend on the petroleum exports of the middle east.
NATO is expected to remain a strong military force
for some time to come, to quote Secretary of Defense, Richard
B. Cheney [Ref. 7:p. 1]:
Despite the dramatic and promising changes in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the risks remain
high - especially as the nations of Eastern Europe
commence to reassess their policies to reflect changed
realities and heightened expectations. As the process
advances NATO must guard against Soviet retrenchment,
the outbreak of irredentism in Eastern Europe or other
contingencies that could prove disruptive to further
progress toward peace and prosperity on the basis of
democratic freedoms. Policy reversals remain for the
Soviet Union a far easier undertaking than for Western
Nations. NATO planning must account for the
uncertainties and recognize that while Soviet military
power may be declining somewhat that is no reason for
the alliance to relax its vigilance.
2. NATO Will Reduce Operational Force Commitments
The assumption that NATO will scale back commitment
of forward deployed/operational forces is proposed in light of
a perceived reduction in threat associated with the Soviet
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Union and the Warsaw Pact following the fragmentation of the
Warsaw Pact, and a successful conclusion to the Conventional
Forces in Europe talks (CFE).
It is expected that the CFE talks will be signed by
late 1990. Further, a summit has been called for late 1990 to
approve a signed treaty. CFE represents the linchpin in arms
control talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the
reduction of conventional arsenals in Europe [Ref. 8:p. 22-
28].
The force levels provided for by a successful CFE
agreement will provide the framework for a controlled build
down in active-duty operational forces that must be supported
by the NATO alliance. While those force levels have yet to be
established, significant action has already been taken within
the alliance which will ensure a decreased commitment to the
current operational force structure.
In April 1990 it was reported that NATO had
officially abandoned the three percent real growth target for
defense spending in lieu of an adjusted formula that has not
yet been published [Ref. 9]. These anticipated cutbacks and
reassessments of growth requirements are clearly a result of
the perception of decreasing regional threat.
3. Diminishing Political and Popular Resolve for
Maintaining Large Standing Forces.
The political resolve to field and maintain large
standing forces is clearly associated with the perceived
threat to national security. The obvious threat associated
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with the Communist block has fueled support by nations to
spend, in varying amounts, to ensure security.
Today we observe communism as a failing economic
doctrine and the Warsaw Pact in a progressive state of
fragmentation. Given the initiatives ongoing within the
Soviet Union and other planned economies in Eastern Europe, it
is assumed that over time, the product of these initiatives
will be some form of market economies. The deficiencies
resulting from the failed systems, that is, low productivity
and an inadequate distribution system, will generate
increasing pressure to meet basic consumer needs. To satisfy
the demand for goods, tremendous capital expenditures will be
required to develop the production capability, capacity, and
a market distribution system. To accomplish this, it is
likely that resources from defense programs will be diverted
to economic development programs. This anticipated decrease
in defense spending within the Soviet block is expected to
precipitate a comparable decrease in NATO defense spending.
The obvious relationship is drawn between perception
of threat, force levels and expenditures. The reader should
note the role CFE will play in the public perception of a
reduced military threat. The conclusion feeds the assumption
that a reduced perception of threat will erode popular
political resolve to support large standing forces.
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4. The Alliance Defense Commitment Will Shift in Part to
Reserve Forces.
As both the requirement and support for large
standing forces decrease, the defense commitment in part will
shift to reserve forces.
Reserve forces represent a financially attractive
option. For example, active U.S. forces incur military
personnel (MILPERS) and operations and maintenance (O&M) costs
at least 50 percent higher for tactical air forces and 400
percent higher for ground forces than their reserve
counterparts. [Ref. 10:p. 40] It is important to note,
however, that any shift in force structure entails certain
transition costs and personnel turbulence costs which
partially offset the advantages.
The concept of a shift in part to a reserve force
structure is contingent upon the assumption than an
unambiguous and politically useful warning time would be
available to mobilize these reserve forces, to bring them to
full capability, and to deploy them to their battle stations
(Ref. 10:p. 40]. Additionally, response time can be decreased
if equipment is prepositioned at or near the designated
theater of operations.
The decision for increased reliance on reserve forces
hinges in part on the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE). Talks associated with the conference aim to
minimize the opportunity for surprise attack. Successful
outcomes of both the CFE and CSCE talks are expected to
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provide a warning window adequate to allow a shift to an
increased reserve force structure.
5. The Role of Defense Industrial Capacity and Reserve
Defense Industrial Capacity.
By accepting the applicability of reserve forces in
meeting defense commitments, we accept the idea of
mobilization and "spool-up" to wartime footing. Part of any
mobilization capability to support prolonged operational
actions is the ability to bring defense and defense related
industry output levels up to meet operational resupply needs.
Not all sustaining materials and equipment can be
prepositioned or held in inventory.
For purposes of this model it is assumed that
increased reliance on reserve forces will include the
development of reserve industrial capabilities to support such
forces on a wartime footing. Modern concepts like "dual-use"
facilities will be important in the development of such
capabilities. Dual use implies joint NATO/commercial
partnerships that would permit the use of key facilities for
commercial purposes during peacetime while preserving their
irreplaceable capabilities for military use during crisis
[Ref. 6).
Such development of defense industrial capabilities
as part of the reserve component of standing military forces
can be expected to stimulate collective and individual
economies of the alliance. By establishing defense, defense
related, and dual-use industrial capabilities it is possible
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that participating nations may develop production advantages,
and as a result, a position favorable to international trade.
The assumptions developed in this chapter are made
recognizing the dynamic state of world politics and the
diversity of popular and political pressures that are at work
within member nations. As with any attempt to model a multi-
variable, dynamic environment for which clarifying assumptions
have been made, questions and assertions contrary to those
assumptions can be presented that undermine the validity of
the model. Mindful of this modeling limit, we will proceed
with its development.
B. NATO BURDEN SHARING: REDEFINED
In developing the following model for the defense burden
within the NATO alliance, we will draw upon the assumptions
that have been posed in the preceding chapter. These
assumptions are based on the political implications of a
significantly reduced Soviet military threat and the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as a credible defense alliance.
These factors are expected to act upon th- NATO alliance in
such a way as to reduce operational requirements in terms of
the commitment of real resrurces.
As developed in tne background sections of this paper, the
commitment of resources has historically been the principal
measure for comparing defense burden shares within the
alliance. This is normally accomplished by the use of
quantitative proxies.
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Accepting the perceived reduction of threat, and the
accompanying diminishing political resolve to field and
maintain large standing forces, an alternate model, which
recognizes the less quantifiable aspects of contribution to
defense burden is proposed. This model recognizes an emergent
structure resulting from reduced operational force
requirements within the alliance. This new structure will
provide the focus for comparison of defense burden and is
illustrated in figure 1.
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NATO BURDEN-SHARING









* REDUCED SOVIET THREAT NON-OPERATIONAL
DEFENSE RELATED
* DIMINISHED NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE







The proposed model for re-defining defense burden shares
within the NATO alliance is composed of both operational and
non-operational factors (figure 2). The operational factors
include standing military forces and reserve military forces.
The non-operational factors include defense industrial
capacity, reserve defense industrial capacity and related
defense factors such as host nation support, civil emergency


















The discussion of the individual components of this model
will not attempt to quantify comparative burdens between
member nations, but will explore information and data
requirements to support comparative evaluation. Additionally,
the availability of such information will be examined,
deficiencies addressed and recommendations developed for the
provision of such data.
1. Standing Military Forces
The component of the defense burden that is most
readily quantified is that which describes the standing
military forces that are fielded and maintained by member
nations to serve the stated requirements of the NATO alliance.
These forces, which include all deployable manpower and
weaponry, are currently tracked for all member nations. Table
2 shows active duty military manpower as reported by the
Secretary of Defense to Congress in the annual report
describing allied contribution to the common defense [Ref. 3].
Of note is the fact that data are included for Japan,
recognizing vital interests and a possible defense role for
Japan in the NATO arena.
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__tal Total Tano __IJILal ]Luk 71 vs 98
Belgiun 106.8 1.796 1.8% 11 110.0 1.9% 2.0% 9 +3.0
Ck.zda 86.9 1.,% 1.*6 12 87.6 1.5 1."% 12 40.7
Dmnmrk 44.5 0.736 0.7% 13 29.8 0.53 0.-% 14 -32.9
France 569.3 9.0% 9.36 3 557.9 9.6% 10. 0 - 3 -2.0
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Luambourg 1.1 0.0C 0.096 15 1.3 0.06 0.0% 15 +19.8
Netherlands 113.0 1.1K 1.99 10 106.7 1.8% 1.9% 10 -5.6
1ormzy 36.3 0.6% 0.6% 14 40.2 0.73 0.7% 13 +10.8
Portugal 244.2 3.96 4.0 7 103.7 1.8% 1.9% 11 -57.5
Turkey 614.5 9.7% 10.1% 2 847.1 14.5Y6 15.1% 2 +37.9
XK 384.0 6.1% 6.3 6 323.7 5.51 5.1n 6 -15.7
ts 2714.0 42.96 44.6% 1 2246.0 38.41 40.1% 1 -17.2
rn US NM 3377.3 53.41 55.4! 3348.5 57.36 59.96 -0.9
Nobn UZ NCO
+ Japan 3611.6 57.1% 3595.7 61.6 -0.4
Total NM 6091.2 96.3Y 100.0;6 5594.5 95.n% 100.0% -8.2
Total NkAD
+ Japan 6325.5 100.036 5841.7 100.0! -7.6
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Decreasing standing force size is expected to be
reflected in these annual totals. This information, which is
groomed and maintained by the Department of Defense, can
provide the quantitative element for manpower in the burden-
sharing model.
Simple manpower count however, is inadequate for
assessing the defense contribution to standing forces.
Factors such as manpower as a percent of total population
(table 3) and Division Equivalent Firepower5 (table 4) are
also considered. Additional components of operational
standing forces are provided in Appendix A, and include
tactical aircraft and Naval tonnage.
With respect to the burden-sharing model proposed in
this work, the standing military forces component does not
require new data generation or tracking as compared to current
burden-sharing analysis efforts.
' Division Equivalent Firepower (DEF) is an indicator of
ground forces combat power based on the quantity and quality
of major weapons. This measure draws on the static assessment
techniques used in the Armored Division Equivalent (ADE)
methodology with additional improvements made to portray more
accurately NATO equipment modernization. The DEF methodology,
which is widely used within DoD and NATO for ground forces
comparisons, provides a more comprehensive picture of combat
effectiveness than do simple counts of combat units and
weapons. The measure deals mainly with weapons' capabilities;
it does not consider such factors as ammunition availability,
logistical support, communications, troop training, and
morale. At this time there is no generally accepted stated
measure of ground combat capability that incorporates all of
these factors. (Source: DoD)
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Table 3
TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY MANPOWER
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2. Reserve Force Readiness
Statistical information for Committed Reserve Force6
manning is currently maintained by the Department of Defense
and reported annually with active force manning levels.
Reporting is limited to the Committed Reserve and says little
about the sophistication of equipment (DEF), or mobilization
time requirements. As the emphasis on reserve force readiness
increases, so should the reporting and data maintenance
requirements.
It has been recommended that the United States make
more extensive use of reserve forces as substitutes for active
duty forces [Ref. 10:p 50]. It has also been recommended that
as forward deployed forces demobilize, their weapons should be
turned over to host nations for use by their active duty or
reserve forces (Ref. 10:p ix]. This can be expected to have
a significant impact on the DEF of those forces and as a
result make their weight in defense contribution more
meaningful.
Reserve reporting should be expanded to include all
reserve mobilization potential. This of course must consider
such things as National Guard and National Police units
meeting the definition of defense units, mobilization time and
division equivalent firepower.
6 Committed Reserves are defined as reservists mobilized
to attain wartime authorized strength.
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The following data illustrate current reporting on
total manpower, including civilian and committed reserves
forces (tables 5,6,7). These data are maintained by the
Department of Defense and reported annually [Ref. 3].
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Table 5
TOTAL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MANPOWER
AND COMMITTED RESERVES

























Be igiun 1.81 1.936 12
Canzda 1.296 1.336 14
Denmrk -~0.996 0.996 is5
France '~9.916 10.1% 3
Gemany I. 11.6%1m. 2
Greece 3.79 3.8% 8
Italy 5.6% S.1No 5
Luzwtourg 0.3 .3 16
N4etherlands 2.2% 2.296 10
?Nbrway 1.81 1.91 11
Portugal 1.336 1.3Y 13
Spain 4.996 5.WYO 7
Turkey 9.K! 10.196 4
UK 5.1% 5.296 6
m38.0?. 38.996 1
Japan 2.33 9
1*m LE NCO2 59.796 61.1%
Non 1z H
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Total NCJO 97.79 100.09
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Belgim 2.41 42.36 4
Canada 0.62 10.9% 14
IDnmrk 2.19 38.^ 7
France 2.32 40.60% 6
Genmny 2.49 43.6 3
Greece 4.85 35.0M 2
Italy 1.29 22.5L 12
LxAmmbourg 0.38 6.n 15
Netherlands 1.94 34.06 9
lrAMmy 5.70 100.01 1
Portugal 1.60 28.06 11
Spain 1.64 28.796 10
Turkey 2.39 41.9% 5
UK 1.17 20.696 13
1B 2.02 35.5)6 8
Japan 0.24 4. A 16
Non S N&I 1.94 33.9!6
14m LE NarO
+ Japan 1.54 27.06
Total NA30 1.97 34.24%
Total M
+ Japan 1.70 29.76
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3. Defense Industrial Capacity and Reserve
Defense Industrial Capacity.
A difficult area for the proposed model is the
availability of specific data to support the comparative
evaluation of a nation's defense industrial capacity and
reserve defense industrial capacity.
For clarification, the reader should note that
reserve industrial capacity represents that production
capacity idle at current economic activity levels, plus a
designated reserve to be utilized only in time of national
crisis or defense mobilization. For the purposes of this
model, production output is expected to vary at or below the
maximum defense industrial capacity. Reserve capacity should
be viewed as a contingency resource not involved in designated
defense production until mobilized.
Reserve industrial capacity may be either
specifically designated defense goods production, such as
tanks, trucks or aircraft or "dual-use" capacity which
produces goods serving commercial demand during peacetime
which can be refitted or retooled to meet specific defense
needs when mobilized. Refitting or retooling would not be
necessary for those dual-use industries whose output
concurrently meets both defense and commercial applications.
In such cases, production output would increase to meet the
additional demand. Should requirements be limited by
capacity, output lots would be defense designated by priority.
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a. Measurement of Capacity
Defense industrial capacities for participating
NATO nations are not calculated, tracked or maintained within
the Department of Defense at this time. Information available
at the time of this writing suggests that production
capacities for selected countries are calculated and
maintained by the United States Federal Reserve and Department
of Commerce, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Of
these sources, none specifically addresses capacities at the
sector or industry level, but rather they approach capacity
analysis from the point of view of gross factors of production
on a national level. Conceptually, the process of determining
the production capacity of a specific industry would parallel
that currently in use for national capacities.
There are two approaches for estimating
industrial capacities that are useful for this model. The
first, and least complex, is measurement in the engineering
sense which represents the maximum attainable level of output
with given factors of production. This method results in a
static evaluation without consideration for the dynamic
economic variables associated with inflationary pressures,
capital markets, labor resource pools and varying energy
costs.
The second method is a more complex approach.
This method is currently in use by the Organization for
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This concept
describes the level of output that is consistent over the
medium-term with stable inflation.
The equations describing this approach can be
found in work by Torres and Martin, published by OECD. [Ref.
ll:p. 130-33] However, it is beyond the scope of this work to
manipulate the existing OECD equations in an effort to
describe specific industry output. The point of suggesting
this method is to illustrate that potential output in the
business sector is defined as the level of output derived from
the production function7 using clearly defined inputs. These
inputs include factors that represent the cost of capital, the
cost of energy, labor efficiency and potential business sector
employment. This potential output represents the maximum
level of output consistent with stable inflation.
It must be recognized that significant work will
be required in grooming this method to meet the needs of
describing defense industrial capacity for purposes of
comparative analysis. However, drawing on Torres and Martin's
work, it can be seen that actual and potential output can be
measured and compared in a meaningful way (figure 3). In this
example a ratio of actual to potential output is provided.
7 Production function is defined as a mathematical
expression that relates quantities of inputs to quantities of
output produced. Production functions can be used to estimate
potential output, assuming full employment of resources with
existing technology. When compared to actual output this
provides a measure of capacity utilization.
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RATIO OF ACTUAL TO POTENTIAL OUTPUT
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Data similarly compared, that is to say, actual
to potential defense industrial output, would serve as input
elements for the defense industrial capacity and reserve
defense industrial capacity components of the burden-sharing
model.
Additional data, as maintained by the Department
of Commerce [Ref. 12], including Federal Reserve data, are
provided in table 8. These data, while neither defense
industry specific, nor inclusive of all NATO participating
nations, represent the kind of information required to support
comparative evaluation of defense industrial capacities and
reserve defense industrial capacities for burden-sharing
purposes. The information under the columns labeled Federal
Reserve Series is available for the United States only and
represents total operating capacity and that portion dedicated
to manufacturing. The determination of which method is most
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1980 80.9 79.3 81.5 82.4 72.7 80.0 76.21981 79.9 78.2 77.6 79.0 72.6 78.3 73.21982 72.1 70.3 77.6 76.4 71.5 77.0 74.21983 74.6 73.9 77.2 78.3 70.6 80.0 76.61984 81.0 80.5 78.2 80.5 74.9 83.0 82.51985 80.4 80.1 79.3 84.2 75.1 84.5 95.81986 79.4 79.7 79.0 84.6 75.4 84.3 85.01987 80.7 81.1 80.0 84.3 77.1 84.0 87.41988 83.3 83.5 82.8 86.7 78.3 84.8 93.61989 83.7 83.9
Seasonally adjusted *
.1986: I 80.2 80.0 79.3 84.3 74.8 84.0 85.41I 79.2 79.6 78.9 84.7 75.5 85.0 84.3III 79.0 79.5 79.1 85.0 75.6 84.0 84.8IV 79.4 79.8 78.8 84.6 75.9 84.0 85.7
1987: I 79.5 80.0 79.5 83.6 77.3 84.0 86.7II 79.9 80.5 79.7 84.2 78.1 84.0 87.31III 81.2 81.4 79.9 84.5 75.6 84.0 86.9IV 82.1 82.3 80.8 85.0 77.4 84.0 89.1
1988: I 82.4 82.7 82.1 84.7 76.5 84.0 92.6II 82.8 83.2 82.5 85.9 78.6 85.0 94.8III 83.8 84.0 83.2 87.4 78.2 85.0 93.3IV 84.1 ' 84.4 .83.3 88.7 79.9 85.0 93.9






• Except for France, Italy, and Netherlands.
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4. Related Defense Factors
The related defense factors component of the burden-
sharing model is intended to recognize and equalize
expenditures that are not clearly associated with defense
capital purchases or operational costs, which still play a
significant role in the overall efficiency of the defense
alliance.
Some nations feel their defense efforts are
understated by specific indicators of actual contributions.
Issues such as host nation support, civil emergency planning
efforts, aid to developing countries and aid to developing
defense industries all have a significant role in the overall
defense mission of the alliance, but are not credited as
contributions under the current formula.
Real estate provided for forward deployed forces has
a clear opportunity cost when compared with alternative uses
in the private sector. The current market value of real
estate made available to Allied forces stationed in Germany,
for example, has been estimated at nearly $24 billion [Ref.
3:p. 2-15].
The hardening of some civil projects to serve as
population shelters is seen in many European and Scandinavian
countries. These expenditures, together with reinforcement
for roads, pipelines and civil communications systems have
direct military support applications, yet cannot be reported
under NATO's defense accounting criteria.
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Consideration for contributions to developing
countries and developing defense industries should also be
assigned in this component. There may be positive stability
implications within the NATO alliance associated with assisted
development, and the defense industrial capacity increase to
be realized as developing defense industries mature is clearly
supportive of the alliance mission.
Few of these issues lend themselves to clear
assignment of value in the burden-sharing sense. Different
factors of production and economic circumstances will provide
different costs for the same project in two countries. Such
differences will require normalization if they are to be
commonly accepted to the accounting of burden-share.
Historically, attempts at normalization have been based upon
monetary exchange rates, but this fails to account for the
production efficiency of the economy.
Information on developmental assistance is generated
and maintained by OECD. This information is used by DoD in
the evaluation of comparative developmental assistance. Table
9 displays net official developmental assistance as provided
by OECD and reported by DOD. [Ref. 3] These data are
considered useful for the support of related defense factors.
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It is important to reiterate that the intent of the
proposed model is not to produce a single quantifiable index
for defense burden comparison. Rather, it should ultimately
produce segregated quantifiable elements that together will
provide a relative indication of the performance of member
nations in terms of contribution to alliance efficiency.
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL
This thesis seeks to redefine NATO defense burden-sharing
in terms that differ from those that have historically been
used. The proposed model, while comprehensive in the
inclusion of substantive elements of defense burden is not
without limitations.
The limitations of this model can be categorized as
functional limitations, those which make the model difficult
to implement at this time; and political and economic
limitations, which result in differing definitions of the
elements of the model and differing motives or incentives for
participation and providing information to support the model.
The functional limitations are associated with the data
required to support analysis and evaluation of defense burdens
within the framework of the model, the most critical being the
availability of data on the defense industrial bases of
participating nations. At the time of this writing, the
United States does not maintain data specifically on the
defense industrial sector of the economy. It is assumed that
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other NATO nations do not gather or maintain such data. This
assumption is based on the lack of evidence available through
normal research channels.
Clearly information concerning the industrial capacities
and capacity utilization is calculated and maintained for key
industries and economies in general. However, to support the
model of burden-sharing proposed herein, specific data on
defense industrial capacities and reserve defense industrial
capacities would be required.
Central to the development of such a database is the
method by which such information could be generated. A
related mathematical model, utilized by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development for generation of
macroeconomic' capacities, has been suggested in this thesis
as a possible starting point for quantifying capacities and
capacity utilization of member nations. Significant
additional work is required to define the input functions and
equation variants appropriate to such a narrowly defined
sector of the economy.
The component of the burden-sharing model titled Related
Defense Factors (e.g., host nation support, civil emergency
planning, aid to developing countries, aid to developing
defense industries and dedicated real estate) seeks to
aggregate those elements of the burden that are not as easily
S Macroeconomic capacities in this sense refer to output
quantification of the entire economy rather than a specific
sector or industry.
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quantifiable as manpower and armaments. The reason these
elements elude quantification is that the value associated
with each is a matter of perception by various nations. Here
then exists a requirement to negotiate agreement on the method
of valuing such contributions. Since members may contribute
differently in this area, a method of equivalent contribution
of share must be devised.
Additional limitations lie in the realm of politics and
economic philosophy. Any system that seeks to compare common
activities between nations must somehow allow for differing
political systems and economic priorities.
Of concern here are the internal economic priorities
established and pursued by member nations. Should they differ
significantly from those of other participating nations, there
may exist incentives to limit or tailor data to suit national
economic priorities at the expense of alliance efficiency or
fair share. This might take the form of free-riding, as
discussed earlier under Perceptions and Burden-Sharing, or
exaggerating contributions. Allowing maximum credit for
significant contributions to alliance efficiency under Related
Defense Factors may dilute some incentive for such actions,
since operational force contributions would be off-set by
contributions which internally benefit the contributing
nation. Until common definitions of contribution and
equivalent measures between different economies are
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established, pressures to favor ones national position will
exist.
It is necessary to recognize the possible political
incentive of some nations to protect defense industrial
capacity and reserve defense industrial capacity data on
grounds of national security interests. Where no specific
case is cited, the reader is reminded of the security
sensitivity that might be associated with revealing total
production potential including surge capability. While not to
be discounted, it is assumed in general that the strength of
the alliance and the benefits of membership will supercede
such concerns.
D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The objectives of this thesis included the development of
a model which incorporated the fundamental components of
defense burden-sharing categorized as standing forces, reserve
forces, defense industrial capacity, reserve defense
industrial capacity and related defense factors. In addition,
the intent included the exploration of the availability of
information to support such a model.
While not inclusive of every aspect of the defense burden,
the model presented in this work clearly represents the major
areas of contribution that are identifiable, and to a
reasonable degree quantifiable.
The intent of the model in not to produce a single index
by which member nations are compared, but rather categories
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through which a relatively greater contribution in one area
might off-set a deficiency in another. By including more of
what constitutes real defense contribution in the model, an
approach to burden-sharing that is perceived as fair to all
participants, from the standpoint of recognizing contribution,
is achieved.
The model provides a reasonable representation of defense
contribution. Because this model is limited by the
availability of information to support it, the following
recommendations are offered:
1. The proposed model should be developed in
greater detail using expanded OECD
production criteria tailored specifically to
defense industries.
2. Efforts should be made to develop reporting
and documentation requirements for
participating nations using the Defense
Planning Questionnaire as an initial
vehicle.
3. A data base should be established and
maintained for the evaluation and tracking
of defense industrial capacities and reserve
defense industrial capacities.
These together will provide a framework of information to
support the evaluation of burden shares using the proposed
model.
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In conclusion, the proposed model represents an alternate
approach to the evaluation of defense contribution which
includes components that historically have not been credited.
Further, significant information is available to support the
operational components of the model, but additional
development is required for the non-operational components.
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III. ISSUES FOR FURTR RESEARCH
Any effort to define a specific quantity, in an area with
so many complex and subjective variables, must generate many
questions that can only be answered through additional
research. The following represent issues that when resolved
will add significantly to the ability to clearly analyze and
quantify the relative defense contribution of alliance
members.
Perhaps the most obvious issue concerns the modeling of
nations' defense industrial capacity and reserve defense
industrial capacity. Techniques for estimating capacity
utilization on a national basis have been described, but it
appears that no specific work concerning defense industry
modeling has been carried out to date. This effort may
initially involve the development of a comprehensive data
base, but should evolve into the development of a specific
defense industry output equation to meaningfully support the
burden-sharing model proposed herein.
A secondary issue to the measurement of defense industrial
capacity is the measurement method itself. Comparison
between the OECD approach, using a medium-term, stable
inflation, dynamic model and a basic engineering approach,
which measures maximum output with specified factors of
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production, will be of value in the refinement of the burden-
sharing model.
We expect defense industrial output to increase as crisis
demand is generated. Conditions which may precipitate that
crisis demand however, may also affect critical input factors
for that industry. For example, large scale mobilization will
directly impact the labor pool and may impact such factors as
petroleum or other raw materials not defined here. Of concern
is the impact that mobilization will have on the secondary
factors that affect the ability of an industry to increase
output.
Assuming a continued favorable trend in international
relations, what existing defense industries can be converted
or modified to allow dual-use application? This conversion
concept would allow the preservation of certain defense
industries in peacetime as budget contraction occurs. This
area may include consideration for commercial computer aided
design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM) operations that can be
reprogrammed to meet defense output requirements on demand.
Mentioned specifically in the model is the requirement to
define, in depth, the reserve force contribution to
operational readiness. This will include mobilization and
deployment time lines, and current Division Equivalent
Firepower defined on a unit basis. Such classification might
be expanded to include tactical aircraft capabilities, surface
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naval combatant capabilities, unit training, experience levels
and morale.
Under the component of related defense factors, assessment
and development of criteria for evaluating and weighing civil
projects is required. (p. 50] Since these contributions are
meaningful in the context of defense preparedness, a standard
of equivalence should be developed to ensure fair credit is
given to participating nations.
Issues concerning the provision and evaluation of defense
contribution information may include the conduct of an initial
survey of participating nations as to their willingness to
provide such specific industrial data as is called for by this
model. Assuming a favorable response, the Defense Planning
Questionnaire should be revised to provide for inclusion of
such data by participating nations. The political
sensitivities associated with such efforts are recognized.
Finally, with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and its
associated military threat, new issues arise that are
concerned with the decision process through which alliance
forces will be committed to action. What force strength is
appropriate for contingency operations and low intensity
conflict, and under what circumstances will they be committed?
How will the lack of a clearly defined threat affect nations'
acceptance of burden shares?
Each of these areas, examined and defined in detail, will
contribute directly to the quantitative comparison of defense
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